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Objectives: The Spanish Government has strengthened tobacco control policies since 2005, 
including changes in tobacco taxes. Because these changes have targeted cigarettes mainly, the 
tobacco industry has marketed cheaper alternative tobacco products, offering smokers the 
possibility to down-trade. This paper traces the evolution of patterns of demand for cigarettes 
and other tobacco products in Spain over the period 2005-2011 in order to assess the impact of 
such tax loopholes. 
 
Methods: We use data on tobacco products prices and sales as well as changes in the structure 
and levels of tobacco taxes to relate tax changes to price changes and subsequent market share 
changes.  
 
Results: Tax reforms have lifted the bottom end of the cigarette price distribution, but the 
industry has been successful in marketing fine cut tobacco at cheap prices. There have been 
partial attempts to correct this asymmetric tax treatment, but these have not avoided a 
remarkable increase in the market share of fine cut tobacco. The absence of a minimum tax on 
quantity for the rest of tobacco products allows the industry to place them as potential future 
down-trading vehicles.  
 
Conclusions: In order to address public health objectives, tax policies should aim to 
equalise the cost of smoking across different  tobacco products. Otherwise the tobacco 
industry can exploit tax loopholes to market cheap alternatives to cigarettes. This requires all 
tobacco products to bear a minimum tax on quantity, whose levels need to be adjusted in order 
to reflect the equivalence between different forms of smoking.  
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Spain has gone a long way in applying tobacco control policies over the last 5 years. A 
complete ban on advertising and sponsorship and a smoking ban at workplaces other 
than bars and restaurants in 2006[1] were followed by several tax reforms and an 
extension of the ban to bars and restaurants at the start of 2011[2]. While some studies 
have addressed the effects of the first set of clean air measures[3-8], less attention has 
been paid to the concommitant fiscal changes and the transformations of the tobacco 
market that they set in motion.  
Within the boundaries of  the European tobacco tax Directives, which require a mixed 
excise system comprising both specific and ad valorem taxes, Spain had traditionally 
relied on ad valorem taxes (a percentage tax based on the monetary value of the 
product) in detriment of specific taxes (fixed taxes based on the quantity of the product). 
This aimed to protect  cheap domestic brands, which under a predominantly ad valorem 
system can be marketed at a discount, against foreign premium brands. The complete 
advertising and sponsorship ban in 2006 (a previous ban affecting only public media 
was passed in 1988) changed the long sustained status quo by reducing competition 
between tobacco suppliers to the price dimension. This triggered the flooding of the 
cigarette market with discount brands, to which suppliers of premium brands such as 
Altria (Phillip Morris) responded by asking for the application of a minimum tax per 
quantity and engaging in a price war as a way to put pressure on the government[9]. The 
Spanish Government reacted by introducing a minimum tax of 55€ per 1000 cigarettes 
in February 2006. This minimum tax on the quantity of cigarettes was subsequently 
increased to 70€ in November 2006, 91.3€ in June 2009 and 116.9 € in December 2010 
(see Table 1). However, other tobacco products (cigars and cigarillos, pipe tobacco and 
fine-cut tobacco used to hand roll cigarettes) remained taxed on an ad valorem basis 
alone until June 2009, when a minimum tax of 50€ per kilogram was implemented on 
fine cut tobacco, a figure revised upwards to 75€ per kilogram in December 2010. Pipe 
tobacco and cigars and cigarillos only bear ad valorem taxes at the time of writing this 













2005 and earlier  0 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 
February '06 to November '06  55 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 
November '06 to June '09  70 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 
June '09 to December '10  91.30 € 50 € 0 € 0 € 





With a view to evaluating the public health implications of the tax policies described 
above, we analyse the tobacco market in Spain over the period 2005-2011. We focus on 
the cost of the various tobacco products and on the shifting patterns of tobacco demand 
to identify loopholes that have hampered the public health effectiveness of tobacco 
taxation. Since other EU countries are also required to implement tax structures and 
levels that comply with EU tobacco tax directives, we are able to draw implications of 
both domestic and international interest. 
METHOD 
We analyse publicly available data on tobacco products sales and prices from 
Comisionado para el Mercado de Tabacos[10], a public agency (formally dependent of 
the Ministry of Finance) in charge of regulating the supply of tobacco products in Spain. 
We use official price indices published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística[11] to 
account for the effects of inflation. We relate changes in the structure and levels for 
tobacco taxes, which are published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado[12], to shifts in the 
distribution of cigarette prices over time, and to the evolution of the relative prices and 
the market shares of the four main tobacco products in the Spanish market: cigarettes, 
cigars and cigarillos (data for which are available only as a composite category), fine-
cut tobacco and pipe tobacco. We abstract from issues related to illegal tobacco 
products on the basis of recent evidence [13] showing that the share of counterfeit and 
contraband cigarettes in the Spanish market has remained stable at 2.4%-2.5% between 
2006 and 2010. This suggests that the tax changes described in the paper have not had 
an impact on the size of the illegal market. 
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RESULTS 
Cost of cigarettes 
Since the reforms described above sought to put an end to the proliferation of cheap 
cigarettes, we first examine the evolution of the distribution of cigarette prices in real 
terms (at 2011 constant prices). It is important to stress that the success of the 
introduction  of a minimum tax has to be gauged by its effect on the lower end of the 
price distribution, so looking at average or median prices is frequently not informative 
enough. Figure 1 shows that the lower end of the cigarette price spectrum became 
cheaper between 2003 and 2005. By early 2006, it was possible to buy a pack of 20 
cigarettes for little more than 1€ (at 2011 prices). Moreover, the average price paid by 
smokers fell from 2.59 € per pack in 2004 to 2.50 € in 2006 (both figures at 2011 
prices). But the introduction of the minimum tax of 55 € per 1000 cigarettes in 2006 and 
its subsequent hikes have effectively lifted the bottom end and compressed the cigarette 






Figure 1. Cigarette prices measured in Euros per pack of 20 
units (at 2011 constant prices). Data for December 1st every year 
over 2002-2010, and May 1st 2011. Boxes represent the lower 
and upper quartiles (25th and 75th percentiles) of the 
distributions, middle bars represent the median, and whiskers 
represent the lowest/highest values within 1.5 times the inter-
quartile range below/above the lower/upper quartile.    
 
Changes in the relative prices of tobacco products 
As mentioned earlier, the 2006 tax reform only applied to manufactured cigarettes. This 
granted tobacco suppliers the possibility of supplying other tobacco products at low 
prices. Such a response from the tobacco industry could have been expected since it is 
well known that downtrading from cigarettes to other tobacco products when taxes on 
the former are hiked  has occurred elsewhere[14]. Figure 2 presents the evolution of a 
real price index for the four tobacco products since 2005.  Note that, up to 2008, fine-
cut tobacco, cigars and cigarillos and pipe tobacco were getting cheaper. The 
introduction of a minimum tax of 50€ per kilogram of fine-cut tobacco in 2009 and its 
subsequent upwards revisions reversed the trend on its price. However, the price of 
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cigars and cigarillos and pipe tobacco, on which no minimum tax have been 
implemented, have continued to fall up until the end of the study period. 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of real price indices of cigarettes, cigars and 
cigarillos, fine cut tobacco and pipe tobacco 2005-2011 (2005 = 
100). 
 
Figure 2 offers however only part of the picture, since it represents the evolution of the 
prices with reference to their own starting level in 2005. To complete the view we need 
to examine the absolute differences in prices across the products. Here we focus on the 
three products that can be easily compared in terms of “packs of 20 cigarette 
equivalents”. We assume that one hand rolled cigarette takes 0.7 grams[15] and that, 
only for the purposes of this comparison, one cigar or cigarillo is equivalent to one 
cigarette.  Since no obvious conversion assumption is available for pipe tobacco, we 
leave it out of the comparison.  
As we show in Figure 3, throughout the study period the most expensive product 
category is cigars and cigarillos whereas the cheapest is fine-cut tobacco for hand-rolled 
cigarettes.  There is  a remarkable gap between manufactured cigarettes and hand-rolled 
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cigarettes, the latter costing about 50% less than the former. This gap remains unaltered 
even after the minimum quantity tax on fine cut tobacco introduced in 2009. In fact, 
Figure 3 shows that this tax did not prompt the equalisation of the cost of manufactured 
and hand-rolled cigarettes. On the contrary, the gap between cigarettes and cigars and 
cigarillos nearly closed towards the end of the study period.  
 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of prices of tobacco products (pack of 20 
cigarettes, 20 rolls using 0.7 g of fine cut tobacco, and 20 cigars 
and cigarillos) 2005-2011 (2011 constant prices).  
 
Changes in the patterns of demand for tobacco products 
While cigarettes (representing 91.1% of sales) take by far the largest share of the 
market, the share of fine cut tobacco has more than trebled (from 1.6% to 5.1% of sales) 
since 2005 (Figure 4). The share of cigars and cigarillos has slightly decreased (from 
4.1% to 3.3% of sales), and that of pipe tobacco has remained marginal (at less than 
0.5% of sales). The increase in the share of fine cut tobacco is mirrored by a drop in the 




Figure 4. Evolution of the market shares of tobacco products 2005-
2011.  
DISCUSSION 
The introduction of the minimum tax of 55€ per 1000 cigarettes in 2006 and its 
subsequent hikes effectively lifted the bottom end and compressed the cigarette price 
distribution reducing the possibilities for downtrading to cheap cigarette brands. It is not 
clear to what extent these reforms were influenced by the lobbying of firms such as 
Altria [9], which have been reported to promote the application of fully specific tax 
structures in other European markets in order to benefit their product portfolio [16]. In 
any case, a better conceived tax package would have avoided an important loophole that 
the tobacco industry has subsequently been able to exploit. Fine-cut tobacco bore no 
minimum tax on quantity until 2009, and the level of such tax has not sufficed to close 
the price gap between manufactured and hand rolled cigarettes up to date. As a result 
the market share of fine-cut tobacco has increased and now surpasses 5% of sales, and it 
is expected to grow further. The availability of a cheap alternative over a period when 
cigarettes were becoming dearer may have deterred price sensitive smokers from 
quitting. In fact, smoking prevalence in adults has barely changed between 2006 
(26.4%)[17] and 2009 (26.2%)[18], the latest year for which comparable data are 
available. A clear policy recommendation emerges from these facts: the tax burden 
between cigarettes and fine-cut tobacco should not create an incentive towards 
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downtrading from manufactured to hand-rolled cigarettes. On the assumption that 
rolling one cigarette takes 0.7 grams, the minimum tax on fine-cut tobacco should be 
increased to 167€ per kilogram (but equivalency rates as low as 0.45 grams per cigarette 
have been reported in some studies [19] so this figure of 167 € per kilogram must be 
interpreted as a lower bound on the necessary adjustment). Otherwise, the effects on the 
propensity to quit smoking (or to refrain from starting to smoke) of any cigarette tax 
increase will be diluted as price sensitive consumers take up hand-rolled cigarettes. 
With the appropriate adjustments in levels, this recommendation can be extended to all 
the EU member states, since the price gap in favour of fine-cut tobacco is pervasive 
across the region.This first loophole is to a great extent a result of having applied an 
asymmetric tax structure across fine-cut tobacco and cigarettes over a crucial 3-year 
period (2006-2009), during which fine-cut tobacco bore no mimimum tax on quantity.  
Likewise, there is a second loophole created by the absence of a minimum tax on 
quantity for cigars and cigarillos. The fall in the cost of smoking cigars or cigarillos, fast 
approaching that of smoking cigarettes, suggests that the tobacco industry is ready to 
exploit the tax differential to place cigars and cigarillos as another downtrading vehicle. 
The policy recommendation in this case consists in applying a minimum tax on 
quantity, either on a per unit or a per weight basis (or even both, given the heterogeneity 
of cigar and cigarillo varieties). The example of the French stance in this regard (a 
minimum tax of 89€ per kilogram) is an interesting benchmark, but the cases of Austria 
or Belgium (applying respectively minimum taxes of 40€ and 64€ per 1000 units) are 
worth considering.  In any case the tax should be modulated to confer no price 
advantage to any product. Again, the recommendation of applying a minimum tax on 
quantity for cigars and cigarillos applies to several EU member states (Greece, Finland, 
Italy, Hungary, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia) that, along with Spain, have 
not started to close this loophole yet.    
Up to date (November 2011), there are several tobacco products that, like pipe tobacco, 
capture a negligible share in the Spanish market: chewing tobacco, inhaling tobacco, 
and “blunts” (a variety of cigars). None of these products bears a minimum per quantity 
tax. They all could at some point in the future become downtrading vehicles for price 
sensitive smokers, much in the same fashion as fine cut tobacco has been recently. The 
alignment of fiscal policy with the commitments of the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control would recommend prompt action from the tax authorities. 
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In conclusion, tax policies in Spain and EU member states should aim to equalise the 
cost of consuming tobacco across different products. Otherwise the tobacco industry 
can exploit the resulting tax loopholes to market cheap alternatives. This requires all 
products to bear a minimum tax on quantity, with levels adjusted in order to reflect the 
equivalence between different forms of consumption. 
 
 
WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS 
This paper identifies important loopholes in the taxation of cigarette products and 
illustrates their consequences for the Spanish tobacco market. The loopholes originate 
from applying a minimum tax on quantity only on cigarettes rather than than on all 
tobacco products. It shows that these loopholes have permitted the marketing of cheap 
alternatives to cigarettes and proposes corrective measures.  
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